supporting new @PrivacySource/PrivacySink annotations

Reviewed By: jeremydubreil

Differential Revision: D3180486

fb-gh-sync-id: 32f719e
fbshipit-source-id: 32f719e
master
Sam Blackshear 9 years ago committed by Facebook Github Bot 9
parent 4b6d754164
commit e1e62be243

@ -838,7 +838,7 @@ let add_constraints_on_retval pdesc prop ret_exp typ callee_pname callee_loc =
(* bind return id to the abducted value pointed to by the pvar we introduced *)
bind_exp_to_abducted_val ret_exp abducted_ret_pv prop in
let prop'' = add_ret_non_null ret_exp typ prop' in
if !Config.taint_analysis && Taint.returns_tainted callee_pname then
if !Config.taint_analysis && Taint.returns_tainted callee_pname None then
add_tainted_post ret_exp { Sil.taint_source = callee_pname; taint_kind = Unknown } prop''
else prop''
else add_ret_non_null ret_exp typ prop
@ -1331,7 +1331,7 @@ and unknown_or_scan_call ~is_scan ret_type_option
IList.fold_left do_exp prop actual_pars in
let add_tainted_pre prop actuals caller_pname callee_pname =
if !Config.taint_analysis then
match Taint.accepts_sensitive_params callee_pname with
match Taint.accepts_sensitive_params callee_pname None with
| [] -> prop
| param_nums ->
let check_taint_if_nums_match (prop_acc, param_num) (actual_exp, _actual_typ) =
@ -1524,13 +1524,14 @@ and proc_call summary {Builtin.pdesc; tenv; prop_= pre; path; ret_ids; args= act
check_return_value_ignored ();
(* In case we call an objc instance method we add and extra spec *)
(* were the receiver is null and the semantics of the call is nop*)
let callee_attrs = Specs.get_attributes summary in
if (!Config.curr_language <> Config.Java) && !Config.objc_method_call_semantics &&
(Specs.get_attributes summary).ProcAttributes.is_objc_instance_method then
handle_objc_method_call actual_pars actual_params pre tenv ret_ids pdesc callee_pname loc
path Tabulation.exe_function_call
path (Tabulation.exe_function_call callee_attrs)
else (* non-objective-c method call. Standard tabulation *)
Tabulation.exe_function_call
tenv ret_ids pdesc callee_pname loc actual_params pre path
callee_attrs tenv ret_ids pdesc callee_pname loc actual_params pre path
end
(** perform symbolic execution for a single prop, and check for junk *)

@ -826,14 +826,16 @@ let add_param_taint proc_name formal_params prop param_nums =
add_tainting_att_param_list prop param_nums formal_params' (Sil.Ataint taint_info)
(* add Auntaint attribute to a callee_pname precondition *)
let mk_pre pre formal_params callee_pname =
let mk_pre pre formal_params callee_pname callee_attrs =
if !Config.taint_analysis then
let pre' = add_tainting_att_param_list (Prop.normalize pre)
(Taint.accepts_sensitive_params callee_pname) formal_params (Sil.Auntaint) in
(Prop.expose pre')
add_tainting_att_param_list
(Prop.normalize pre)
(Taint.accepts_sensitive_params callee_pname (Some callee_attrs))
formal_params
Sil.Auntaint
|> Prop.expose
else pre
(** Construct the actual precondition: add to the current state a copy
of the (callee's) formal parameters instantiated with the actual
parameters. *)
@ -864,7 +866,7 @@ let mk_actual_precondition prop actual_params formal_params =
let actual_pre = Prop.prop_sigma_star prop instantiated_formals in
Prop.normalize actual_pre
let mk_posts ret_ids prop callee_pname posts =
let mk_posts ret_ids prop callee_pname callee_attrs posts =
match ret_ids with
| [ret_id] ->
let mk_getter_idempotent posts =
@ -891,7 +893,7 @@ let mk_posts ret_ids prop callee_pname posts =
IList.filter (fun (prop, _) -> not (returns_null prop)) posts
else posts in
let mk_retval_tainted posts =
if Taint.returns_tainted callee_pname then
if Taint.returns_tainted callee_pname (Some callee_attrs) then
let taint_retval (prop, path) =
let prop_normal = Prop.normalize prop in
let prop' =
@ -1004,12 +1006,13 @@ let check_uninitialize_dangling_deref callee_pname actual_pre sub formal_params
(** Perform symbolic execution for a single spec *)
let exe_spec
tenv ret_ids (n, nspecs) caller_pdesc callee_pname loc prop path_pre
tenv ret_ids (n, nspecs) caller_pdesc callee_pname callee_attrs loc prop path_pre
(spec : Prop.exposed Specs.spec) actual_params formal_params : abduction_res =
let caller_pname = Cfg.Procdesc.get_proc_name caller_pdesc in
let posts = mk_posts ret_ids prop callee_pname spec.Specs.posts in
let posts = mk_posts ret_ids prop callee_pname callee_attrs spec.Specs.posts in
let actual_pre = mk_actual_precondition prop actual_params formal_params in
let spec_pre = mk_pre (Specs.Jprop.to_prop spec.Specs.pre) formal_params callee_pname in
let spec_pre =
mk_pre (Specs.Jprop.to_prop spec.Specs.pre) formal_params callee_pname callee_attrs in
L.d_strln ("EXECUTING SPEC " ^ string_of_int n ^ "/" ^ string_of_int nspecs);
L.d_strln "ACTUAL PRECONDITION =";
L.d_increase_indent 1; Prop.d_prop actual_pre; L.d_decrease_indent 1; L.d_ln ();
@ -1262,7 +1265,8 @@ let exe_call_postprocess ret_ids trace_call callee_pname loc results =
| _ -> res
(** Execute the function call and return the list of results with return value *)
let exe_function_call tenv ret_ids caller_pdesc callee_pname loc actual_params prop path =
let exe_function_call
callee_attrs tenv ret_ids caller_pdesc callee_pname loc actual_params prop path =
let caller_pname = Cfg.Procdesc.get_proc_name caller_pdesc in
let trace_call res =
match Specs.get_summary caller_pname with
@ -1280,8 +1284,19 @@ let exe_function_call tenv ret_ids caller_pdesc callee_pname loc actual_params p
L.d_strln ("START EXECUTING SPECS FOR " ^ Procname.to_string callee_pname ^ " from state");
Prop.d_prop prop; L.d_ln ();
let exe_one_spec (n, spec) =
exe_spec tenv ret_ids (n, nspecs) caller_pdesc callee_pname loc prop path
spec actual_params formal_params in
exe_spec
tenv
ret_ids
(n, nspecs)
caller_pdesc
callee_pname
callee_attrs
loc
prop
path
spec
actual_params
formal_params in
let results = IList.map exe_one_spec spec_list in
exe_call_postprocess ret_ids trace_call callee_pname loc results

@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ val d_splitting : splitting -> unit
(** Execute the function call and return the list of results with return value *)
val exe_function_call:
Tenv.t -> Ident.t list -> Cfg.Procdesc.t -> Procname.t -> Location.t ->
ProcAttributes.t -> Tenv.t -> Ident.t list -> Cfg.Procdesc.t -> Procname.t -> Location.t ->
(Sil.exp * Sil.typ) list -> Prop.normal Prop.t -> Paths.Path.t ->
(Prop.normal Prop.t * Paths.Path.t) list

@ -216,15 +216,21 @@ let mk_pname_param_num methods =
(fun (mname, param_num) -> method_str_to_pname mname, param_num)
methods
let sinks =
let taint_sinks =
mk_pname_param_num sinks
let func_with_tainted_params =
mk_pname_param_num functions_with_tainted_params
let attrs_opt_get_annots = function
| Some attrs -> attrs.ProcAttributes.method_annotation
| None -> Sil.method_annotation_empty
(** returns true if [callee_pname] returns a tainted value *)
let returns_tainted callee_pname =
IList.exists (fun pname -> Procname.equal pname callee_pname) sources
let returns_tainted callee_pname callee_attrs_opt =
IList.exists (fun pname -> Procname.equal pname callee_pname) sources ||
let ret_annot, _ = attrs_opt_get_annots callee_attrs_opt in
Annotations.ia_is_privacy_source ret_annot
let find_callee methods callee_pname =
try
@ -232,8 +238,15 @@ let find_callee methods callee_pname =
with Not_found -> []
(** returns list of zero-indexed argument numbers of [callee_pname] that may be tainted *)
let accepts_sensitive_params callee_pname =
find_callee sinks callee_pname
let accepts_sensitive_params callee_pname callee_attrs_opt =
match find_callee taint_sinks callee_pname with
| [] ->
let _, param_annots = attrs_opt_get_annots callee_attrs_opt in
let offset = if Procname.java_is_static callee_pname then 0 else 1 in
IList.mapi (fun param_num attr -> (param_num + offset, attr)) param_annots
|> IList.filter (fun (_, attr) -> Annotations.ia_is_privacy_sink attr)
|> IList.map fst
| tainted_params -> tainted_params
(** returns list of zero-indexed parameter numbers of [callee_pname] that should be
considered tainted during symbolic execution *)

@ -10,10 +10,10 @@
open! Utils
(** returns true if [callee_pname] returns a tainted value *)
val returns_tainted : Procname.t -> bool
val returns_tainted : Procname.t -> ProcAttributes.t option -> bool
(** returns list of zero-indexed argument numbers of [callee_pname] that may be tainted *)
val accepts_sensitive_params : Procname.t -> int list
val accepts_sensitive_params : Procname.t -> ProcAttributes.t option -> int list
(** returns list of zero-indexed parameter numbers of [callee_pname] that should be
considered tainted during symbolic execution *)

@ -126,6 +126,8 @@ let performance_critical = "PerformanceCritical"
let no_allocation = "NoAllocation"
let ignore_allocations = "IgnoreAllocations"
let suppress_warnings = "SuppressWarnings"
let privacy_source = "PrivacySource"
let privacy_sink = "PrivacySink"
let ia_is_nullable ia =
ia_ends_with ia nullable
@ -201,6 +203,11 @@ let ia_is_ignore_allocations ia =
let ia_is_suppress_warnings ia =
ia_ends_with ia suppress_warnings
let ia_is_privacy_source ia =
ia_ends_with ia privacy_source
let ia_is_privacy_sink ia =
ia_ends_with ia privacy_sink
type annotation =
| Nullable

@ -89,6 +89,8 @@ val ia_is_performance_critical : Sil.item_annotation -> bool
val ia_is_no_allocation : Sil.item_annotation -> bool
val ia_is_ignore_allocations : Sil.item_annotation -> bool
val ia_is_suppress_warnings : Sil.item_annotation -> bool
val ia_is_privacy_source : Sil.item_annotation -> bool
val ia_is_privacy_sink : Sil.item_annotation -> bool
val ia_iter : (Sil.annotation -> unit) -> Sil.item_annotation -> unit

@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
<classpath>
<pathelement location="../../dependencies/java/jackson/jackson-2.2.3.jar"/>
<pathelement location="../lib/java/models.jar"/>
<pathelement location="../annotations//annotations.jar"/>
</classpath>
</javac>
</target>

@ -109,6 +109,21 @@
"file": "codetoanalyze/java/infer/TaintExample.java",
"procedure": "InputStream TaintExample.taintingShouldNotPreventInference2(SSLSocketFactory)"
},
{
"bug_type": "TAINTED_VALUE_REACHING_SENSITIVE_FUNCTION",
"file": "codetoanalyze/java/infer/TaintExample.java",
"procedure": "void TaintExample.testPrivacySinkAnnot1()"
},
{
"bug_type": "TAINTED_VALUE_REACHING_SENSITIVE_FUNCTION",
"file": "codetoanalyze/java/infer/TaintExample.java",
"procedure": "void TaintExample.testPrivacySinkAnnot3()"
},
{
"bug_type": "TAINTED_VALUE_REACHING_SENSITIVE_FUNCTION",
"file": "codetoanalyze/java/infer/TaintExample.java",
"procedure": "void TaintExample.testPrivacySourceAnnot()"
},
{
"bug_type": "NULL_DEREFERENCE",
"file": "codetoanalyze/java/infer/NullPointerExceptions.java",

@ -109,6 +109,21 @@
"file": "infer/tests/codetoanalyze/java/infer/TaintExample.java",
"procedure": "InputStream TaintExample.taintingShouldNotPreventInference2(SSLSocketFactory)"
},
{
"bug_type": "TAINTED_VALUE_REACHING_SENSITIVE_FUNCTION",
"file": "infer/tests/codetoanalyze/java/infer/TaintExample.java",
"procedure": "void TaintExample.testPrivacySinkAnnot1()"
},
{
"bug_type": "TAINTED_VALUE_REACHING_SENSITIVE_FUNCTION",
"file": "infer/tests/codetoanalyze/java/infer/TaintExample.java",
"procedure": "void TaintExample.testPrivacySinkAnnot3()"
},
{
"bug_type": "TAINTED_VALUE_REACHING_SENSITIVE_FUNCTION",
"file": "infer/tests/codetoanalyze/java/infer/TaintExample.java",
"procedure": "void TaintExample.testPrivacySourceAnnot()"
},
{
"bug_type": "NULL_DEREFERENCE",
"file": "infer/tests/codetoanalyze/java/infer/NullPointerExceptions.java",

@ -3,7 +3,8 @@ sources = glob(['**/*.java'])
dependencies = [
'//infer/lib/java/android:android',
'//dependencies/java/jackson:jackson',
'//infer/lib/java:models'
'//infer/lib/java:models',
'//infer/annotations:annotations',
]
java_library(

@ -25,6 +25,8 @@ import android.content.ContentValues;
import android.content.SharedPreferences;
import com.facebook.infer.models.InferTaint;
import com.facebook.infer.annotation.PrivacySource;
import com.facebook.infer.annotation.PrivacySink;
public class TaintExample {
@ -170,4 +172,39 @@ public class TaintExample {
values.put(key, value);
}
@PrivacySource("")
public String privacySource() {
return "source";
}
public void testPrivacySourceAnnot() {
InferTaint.inferSensitiveSinkUndefined(privacySource()); // should report
}
public void instancePrivacySink(@PrivacySink("") String s1, String s2) {
}
public static void staticPrivacySink(@PrivacySink("") String s1, String s2) {
}
public void testPrivacySinkAnnot1() {
String source = privacySource();
instancePrivacySink(source, ""); // should report
}
public void testPrivacySinkAnnot2() {
String source = privacySource();
instancePrivacySink("", source); // should not report
}
public void testPrivacySinkAnnot3() {
String source = privacySource();
staticPrivacySink(source, ""); // should report
}
public void testPrivacySinkAnnot4() {
String source = privacySource();
staticPrivacySink("", source); // should not report
}
}

@ -54,7 +54,10 @@ public class TaintTest {
"interprocTaintErrorWithModelMethodsUndefined1",
"interprocTaintErrorWithModelMethodsUndefined2",
"interprocTaintErrorWithModelMethodsUndefined3",
"contentValuesPutWithTaintedString"
"contentValuesPutWithTaintedString",
"testPrivacySourceAnnot",
"testPrivacySinkAnnot1",
"testPrivacySinkAnnot3"
};
assertThat(

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